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ABSTRACT 
 
When asked if they, a friend or a family member has borrowed cash quickly, spur-of-the-moment, 
with little or no credit checking or collateral, many respond affirmatively.  Twenty-one of eighty- 
two students (25.6%) from my Spring, 2007, Personal Finance course  have first-hand knowledge 
of a credit card cash advance, while seven of eighty-two students (8.5%) have first-hand 
knowledge of a payday loan transaction.  Two of eighty-two students (2.4%) claim to know of 
instances of both methods of obtaining cash quickly.  While both methods of borrowing should be 
avoided, should an emergency loan be necessary, the cost of a credit card cash advance is 
significantly lower than the cost of a payday loan.  
 
 
THE COSTS OF PAYDAY LOANS 
 
ayday loans offer short-term cash advances on their customer’s next paycheck for fees starting around 
$15 per $100 borrowed.  These loans carry APRs that generally range from 391% to 443% (Stephens, 
2003).  By requiring full repayment within a short period of time, generally two weeks, with no option 
to make payments in installments, lenders compel payday borrowers to return again and again, renewing a loan for 
another large fee without being able to pay down the principal. This loan flipping is the foundation of the payday 
lending business model.  Even as the costly nature of payday lending has become clear, the industry continues to 
grow at a significant pace.  Payday loan volume is at least $28 billion a year, growing by well over 100% over a 
recent five year period (Stegman and Feris, 2003).  In nearby Hudson, Wisconsin, three payday lenders have opened 
in the past five years.   
 
The payday lending industry’s growth is based on their successful lobbying for legalized loan flipping, 
creating a chronic borrowing condition (Fox, 2004).  A report by the Center for Responsible Lending found that the 
one-time, two-week loan that payday lenders market is virtually nonexistent (Ernst, Farris, King, 2003).  In the 
report, only one percent of payday loans go to borrowers who take out one loan per year and walk away free and 
clear after paying it off. The industry relies almost entirely on revenue from borrowers caught in a debt trap; ninety-
one percent of payday loans go to borrowers with five or more loan transactions per year.  The data show that 
payday loans are, in fact, designed to be renewed.  
 
Contrary to prudent lending practices, payday lenders do not make loans based on the borrower’s ability to 
repay. Borrowers need only a checking account and a pay stub verifying employment to qualify for a payday loan, 
which averages about $300 (Advance America, 2007).  The loans are secured by the borrower’s signed personal 
check, which is dated on the borrower’s next payday. The lender may submit this “live” check to the bank for 
payment should the borrower default. But most borrowers are unable to pay the loan back in full when it is due and 
still have enough cash to make it to their next payday.       
 
Payday lending costs borrowers $4.2 billion in predatory fees (King, Parrish, Tanik, 2006). The prospect of 
bouncing the check left in the hands of the lender, often accompanied by fear of criminal prosecution for writing a 
“bad check,” puts tremendous pressure on the borrower to avoid default. So the borrower generally pays another fee, 
typically $50 on a $300 loan, to renew or float the loan for another pay period. This transaction is called a rollover. 
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Or the lender may close out the loan and reopen it quickly to the same effect, called a back-to-back transaction.  
Back-to-back transactions and rollovers cost the borrower exactly the same amount, typically $50 every payday until 
they can pay off the loan in full and walk away. However renewals are accomplished, over time the borrower finds it 
harder to pay off the loan principal for good as fees are stripped from their earnings every payday. They are 
frequently trapped paying this interest for months or even years, and many go to a second or third payday lender in 
an often fruitless attempt to escape the trap (www.responsiblelending.org., 2007).  The process of loan flipping 
creates the long-term cycle of credit dependency.  Table 1 indicates the average cost of a payday loan, including an 
average of eight flips (King, et.al, 2006). 
 
 
Table 1:  Average principal and interest paid back on payday loan 
Average principal (from state regulator data): $325 
Typical fee for $325 loan: $52 
Average transactions per year: 9 
Total interest for original loan + 8 flips $468 
Annual percentage rate 416% 
 
 
By obscuring the long-term nature of their loans, payday lenders were initially successful in convincing 
state legislators to exempt their product from existing small loan laws.  Many states have annual interest rate caps of 
36% or less for small loans, but have authorized rates far higher rates for payday loans on the grounds that these are 
emergency two-week loans, not long-term obligations.  Other states recognized the costly nature of payday loans 
and refuse to grant payday lenders exemptions from small loan laws, prompting some payday lenders to disguise 
their loans as other products in order to continue illegal lending practices (Cooper, 2004).  
 
By far the most pervasive method payday lenders have used to circumvent state lending laws is what they 
call the agency model, also known as “rent-a-bank.”  Under this arrangement, large payday lending companies 
typically partner with very small banks located in states with lenient lending laws. The payday lenders claim that 
their association with the partner bank allows them to preempt state law and make payday loans in states where they 
would otherwise be illegal. 
 
COST OF CREDIT CARD CASH ADVANCES 
 
Credit card cash advances can provide consumers with convenient and instant access to cash in times of 
financial need.  But this ease and convenience comes with a high price.  Fees are computed using two calculation 
methods. Many card issuers calculate fees on a percentage basis, which typically ranges from 2% to 4%. Other 
issuers charge "flat fees" for advances. "Flat fees" are not based on the amount of the advance and, therefore, are 
always the same.  An increasing trend is to combine both calculation methods. An example of this would be an 
issuer that charges x% for an advance, but charges a minimum of $10 regardless of the amount of the advance.  
Finally, a fee may be charged for advance from an ATM machine. 
 
Often the greatest potential pitfall for consumers who decide to get a cash advance involves finance or 
interest charges. The interest rate for cash advances is often several points higher than the normal purchase interest 
rate. Cash advance rates normally range from 20% to 25%. In contrast, the average purchase rate for a standard 
credit card ranges from 15.88% to 17.30% (www.youngmoney.com/credit, 2007).   
 
Other finance charge pitfalls involve grace periods and the payment method that a card issuer utilizes. Cash 
advances begin accruing interest immediately and, therefore, do not benefit from a grace period. Thus, even when a 
card balance is paid in full within the billing cycle, a finance charge will still be assessed for any advances. 
 
A similar pitfall involves the manner in which payments are applied to your account. Most issuers apply 
payments to card purchases before they apply payments to cash advances (i.e. payments are first applied to 
purchases).   
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2008 Volume 6, Number 8 
3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
Costs of student credit card cash advances were obtained through fifteen web sites identified through 
www.bankrate.com.  Payday loan cost information was obtained through the three payday lenders in Hudson, 
Wisconsin, in addition to twenty-seven internet-based payday lenders.  The scenario in each case was a $100 loan 
for two weeks.  A two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances was conducted on these sample populations (see 
Table 2).  Variable 1 is the cost of a student credit card cash advance; variable 2 is the cost of a payday loan. 
 
 
Table 2:  T-Test:  Two Sample Assuming Unequal Variance 
 Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 10.90719 21.12433 
Variance 14.48584 49.33049 
Observations 15 30 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 43  
t Stat -6.32416  
P(T<=t) one-tail 6.17E-08  
t Critical one-tail 1.681071  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.23E-07  
t Critical two-tail 2.016692  
      
 
The rejection region probability as computed by Excel is 1.23E-07.  This .000000123 probability definitely 
warrants rejection of the null hypothesis of no significant difference between means.  The mean cost of a student 
credit card cash advance of $10.91 is significantly less than the cost of an average payday loan of $21.12. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Borrowing “on-the-fly” without credit checks or collateral is a costly proposition, to be avoided if at all 
possible.  If it must be done, my research corroborates the literature finding that payday loans are extraordinarily 
expensive, well exceeding the cost of a cash advance from a student credit card.  
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